Introduction
It is a well-established result, both theoretically and empirically, that taxes play an important role in determining the capital structure of companies (e.g. Miller, 1958, 1963; Desai, Foley and Hines, 2004) . A multinational company in particular can choose its capital structure according to differences in international taxation, in order to minimize the tax burden of the whole company group. Borrowing from affiliates located in low-tax countries and lending to affiliates in high-tax locations will allow a deduction of interest payments from profits at high-tax locations and a reduction of the overall tax payments. Typically, high-tax countries attempt to restrict the use of inter-company loans by imposing so-called thin-capitalization or earning stripping rules to limit adverse revenue consequences. In recent years, increased attention has been given to the role of multinationals' profit shifting via inter-company loans. For example, the number of EU member countries that rely on some form of debt-to-equity restriction has increased from 8 in 1996
to 16 in 2005. From a theoretical perspective, these rules are suitable for limiting profit shifting (e.g. Fuest and Hemmelgarn, 2005; Panteghini, 2006) . Nevertheless, empirical evidence as to whether governments have been successful is still rare. Indeed, this is crucial for policy makers who want to defend tax revenues against multinationals' crosscountry tax planning. However, effective thin-capitalization rules possibly imply less financial flexibility for some firms and adversely affect investment. In order to evaluate this trade-off, it is important to find out more about the impact of thin-capitalization rules on financial decisions and the associated tax-revenue effects.
In providing evidence on the tax sensitivity of companies' capital structure choices, previous empirical studies have usually not taken into account thin-capitalization rules. However, for a sample of US controlled affiliates, Desai et al. (2004) show that higher local tax F o r P e e r R e v i e w 2 rates are associated with higher debt-to-asset ratios. Their analysis points out that particularly internal borrowing of US companies reacts sensitively to taxation. This result is confirmed by Buettner et al. (2006a) , and by Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005) for German multinationals. So far, evidence for the effects of thin-capitalization rules on companies' decisions has only been provided by Buettner et al. (2006b) . They find that thincapitalization rules effectively restrict debt finance but also affect investment levels of German outbound investments.
The question we address in this paper is whether thin-capitalization rules effectively restrict multinationals tax-planning behaviour. For our empirical research we take German inbound investment data. We expect German multinationals to engage in tax-planning activities, because hardly any other country has higher statutory corporate tax rates than
Germany. We exploit legal amendments of the German thin-capitalization rule in 2001 and
2004, where only some legal forms were treated. This quasi-experimental setting enables us to use a difference-in-differences approach to identify whether thin-capitalization rules are successfully imposed. Our empirical analysis shows that both tax-rate differentials and thin-capitalization rules are crucial for multinationals' capital structures. In particular, our findings indicate that some companies, which were affected by a stricter thin-capitalization rule, subsequently adjusted their capital structure. Hence, governments in high-tax countries are, to some extent, able to restrict multinationals' profit shifting.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin with some institutional details about the German thin-capitalization rule. Thereafter, we set up a theoretical model, which considers the financing decision of a multinational and takes into account a thin-capitalization rule. In sections 4 and 5 we present the empirical investigation approach and the data. The empirical results are presented in section 6. Section 7 briefly concludes. 
Some Institutional Details
The high level of German company taxation but also the comparatively low corporate tax revenues are well documented (see European Communities, 2005) . Firms are burdened with a very high statutory tax rate comprising a corporate income tax and, additionally, a local trade income tax.
It is reasonable to assume that a multinational company allocates inter-company loans optimally with respect to differences in international taxation. Hence, taxable profits are reduced by means of interest deduction. As a result, jurisdictions lose corporate tax revenue and consequently try to defend their tax base by imposing some form of restriction, for example thin-capitalization rules. These rules, such as section 8(a) of the German corporate income tax law (KStG), typically limit interest deduction up to a fixed relation between equity and inter-company debt, i.e. the interest paid for an excess leverage cannot be deducted from the tax base.
Empirical identification of thin-capitalization rules, however, is difficult. In practice its application depends on several additional aspects besides the pure debt-to-equity ratio.
Some inter-company loans are excluded, such as debt which fulfils the arm's length principle requirements or trade accounts payable due to internal deliveries of input goods. Furthermore, the debt-to-equity ratio is not only limited to internal leverage. For instance, a strategy called back-to-back finance, in which external debt is borrowed by an affiliate and simultaneously secured by a deposit of the parent company, is also prohibited by the German thin-capitalization rule. Whether back-to-back finance is ultimately considered as parent-company debt finance is often a matter of negotiation with tax authorities. Hence, we
are not able to identify single companies in the data which are affected by thin-F o r P e e r R e v i e w 4 capitalization rules, although we know the exact German threshold levels. Therefore, we use changes in the rules for some company groups, depending on their legal form, to obtain exogenous variation in this crucial explanatory variable.
The German thin-capitalization rule only applies to foreign affiliates that are incorporated.
1 First-tier foreign partnerships are not affected by the restriction and constitute a suitable non-treatment group when looking at legal amendments of this rule as natural experiments.
The rule classifies two different types of incorporated companies. The first group of companies comprises ordinary corporations which are not classified as holdings. For purposes of this law, a holding is defined as a firm where more than 75% of total assets consist of shares in other corporations. For ordinary corporations, the allowed debt-to-equity ratio, called safe haven, was accepted at 3:1 before 2001. Yet, the safe haven debt-to-equity ratio was 9:1 in the case of a holding corporation, i.e. holdings could be used as loopholes. In 2001 and 2004, two important amendments of the German thin-capitalization rule were introduced. In 2001 the allowed debt-to-equity ratios were significantly reduced to 1.5:1 in the case of an ordinary corporation and to 3:1 in the case of a holding corporation, respectively. Nevertheless, a possible loophole in the shape of holding corporations remained. In 2004, this special rule for holding corporations was also abolished, i.e. the safe haven was generally constituted at 1.5:1 for every corporation. However, first-tier partnerships were not affected by these amendments.
To illustrate the change in the thin-capitalization rule, let us consider the following example. A German holding corporation has used internal debt as a source of finance, with an internal-debt-to-equity ratio of 4:1 in 2000. Hence, this corporation was allowed to deduct interest payments without restriction. Following the 2001 tax reform, however, the ac-1 One exemption would be the German rule introduced in 2004 which applies to cases in which a second-tier partnership is held by incorporated foreign affiliates. However, these cases are not considered in our analysis. cepted ratio was reduced to 3:1. Therefore, the corporation was no longer able to deduct interest payments for 5 percentage points of its debt-to-equity share. Nevertheless, the corporation was not prohibited from maintaining its debt-to-equity ratio. It is important to bear in mind, however, that not every corporationIirrespective of its legal formIis affected by a stricter thin-capitalization rule. It is highly possible that many firms fall below the accepted debt-to-equity relation anyway. We will come back to this point in section 6, discussing which implications this has for the estimated coefficients.
A Model
We explain the impact of company taxation on the choice of debt or equity as a subsidi- Moreover, we assume that inter-company loans are associated with additional costs, for example agency costs, because of asymmetric information (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977) . Nevertheless, there are also non-tax reasons to use inter-company debt, such as short-term cash management between parent and affiliate, or the opportunity to control the local management through fixed annual interest payments (see Jensen, 1986 Subsequently, the profit function of the firm can be described as
Obviously, the transition of equity into inter-company debt implies a direct profit shift from the borrowing affiliate 2 to the lending parent company 1 if the tax rate of the borrowing affiliate is higher than the tax rate of the lender. The tax-rate differential between both locations creates incentives to use equity refinanced internal debt as a source of finance. It implies that profits are shifted to the lending affiliate. However, jurisdictions attempt to counteract these activities by imposing thincapitalization rules, which typically limit interest deduction. Hence, interest paid for an excess leverage cannot be deducted from the tax base if j µ is above a certain fixed j µ .
We now assume that country 2 introduces such a rule, denoted by 2 , where 1 2 = if the rule is effectively binding, and 0 otherwise. Whether the rule is binding for an affiliate depends on the difference between the actual inter-company debt share and the maximum accepted, i.e. whether a company is above the threshold level or not, and how the type of internal debt is classified for tax purposes. Note that 2 is always 0 if 2 2 µ µ < . We extend the profit function by the additional tax payments arising from excess leverage above the thin-capitalization rule limit:
The optimal share of inter-company debt of subsidiary 2 financed by parent equity is obtained by the following first-order condition
First, we consider the case without application of a thin-capitalization rule. Accordingly, the share of inter-company debt is determined by the tax-rate difference between the borrowing affiliate and the parent company, ) ( 1 2 t t i . The internal lending rate can be used to Secondly, we consider cases where the thin-capitalization rule is applied. If 2 becomes 1, any tax incentive to use internal debt is effectively stopped. In this case, only the tax-rate level at the location of the lending parent has an impact. Additionally, inter-company debt used for non-tax reasons becomes more expensive, because inter-company interest payments are taxed twice. Assuming a binding case, this is an incentive to reduce 2 µ in order to avoid enforcement of the thin-capitalization rule.
We can derive comparative static properties by differentiating the first-order condition:
First, let us consider the effect of an increasing tax rate at the lending company's location on the share of inter-company debt used by its affiliate. 
Expression (4) is always negative, i.e. the inter-company debt used by an affiliate decreases with an increasing tax rate at the parent's location. With regard to the marginal effect of an increasing tax rate at the affiliate's location we obtain
This expression is positive when the thin-capitalization rule is not enforced, i.e. . 0 2 = Otherwise, if the share of inter-company debt is above the limits, i.e. 1 2 = , a tax 5 We assume a zero marginal tax-rate effect on the internal interest rate 2 i . This is a reasonable assumption, because the arm's length principle is easily applied to interest rates. rate increase has no effect on the optimal share of inter-company debt. This can be explained by the fact that interest payments for the excessive debt cannot be deducted for tax purposes. Higher internal borrowing must be due to non-tax reasons, e.g. short-term cash management. Accordingly, a tax-rate variation does not matter for the optimal intercompany debt in this case. To sum up, the following proposition can be set up: where the rule is binding and enforced. However, it should be emphasized that identification of each affected company is difficult due to various reasons we already discussed in section 2. Equation (3) implies that tax incentives to use inter-company debt decrease. In this case, the firm reduces its debt share below the new threshold level and prefers equity as the marginal source of finance. Therefore, we would expect that the level of intercompany loans has, on average, decreased since 2001 and 2004, respectively. 
Proposition 2: If inter-company debt is a channel for shifting taxable profits, and thincapitalization rules can limit tax-planning behaviour, a reduction of the allowed debt-toequity ratio should lead to smaller shares of inter-company debt. Non-incorporated com-

Empirical Implications
We test the above propositions empirically by using data for German inbound FDI. A simple estimation approach to test proposition 1 could be a regression of the inter-company leverage, denoted by ICL, of an investment in country G (Germany) taken by firm k located in country j in period t on the tax-rate differential (
) and on some company-specific characteristics t j x , . Thus, a simple regression equation would be
where k a is a company-specific effect to control for heterogeneity between company groups. Furthermore, we control for German capital market constraints or aggregate shocks by a time-specific effect t a . Note that we are able to identify tax-rate effects because of cross-country and time variation in t j STR , . Following proposition 1, we expect a positive sign of the tax differential coefficient 1 a on ICL . For inter-company debt, which is refinanced by equity, the local interest rate at the lending parent country should be irrelevant.
Only the German lending rate could be of importance, as it is used as the arm's length benchmark by the German tax authority. However, we implicitly control for the German lending rate by time effects t a , since every inbound investor faces the same lending rate.
We cannot explicitly identify companies which are affected by stricter thin-capitalization rules. However, two reforms in 2001 and 2004 constitute exogenous sources of variation, unambiguously affecting the average value of our dependent variable for some groups. 
The treatment group consists of both ordinary corporations and holding corporations. It is important to bear in mind that partnerships were not treated by the German thincapitalization rule and constitute a suitable non-treatment group of the reform in 2001.
Group-independent time trends are absorbed by t b . Therefore, we implicitly control for yearly variations in German tax rates. The treatment effect is measured by 4 b , where we expect a negative sign.
Furthermore, for the 2004 reform effect, we propose the following equation
where only holdings were treated by the reform of the German thin-capitalization rule in
2004. Therefore, all other companies, incorporated and non-incorporated, constitute the non-treatment group. We would also expect a negative sign of the treatment effect 4 c . for example, internal finance. Furthermore, we control for differences across single investments, for example by using the affiliate-specific turnover as a control variable. We additionally assume that there are no systematic changes in within-and between-group compositions. In fact, our group sizes are almost stable over time. To identify the effect on the treated companies, a further critical assumption is that both groups are equally affected by aggregate shocks.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis uses the MiDi database for multinationals provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. This is a comprehensive annual micro database of direct investment positions of German enterprises held abroad as well as of direct investment positions held in Germany by foreign companies. However, we employ only German inbound FDI data. The data provides information about the investment object's balance sheet, including further information on the type of investment and on the investor. A favourable characteristic of the data is the possibility to trace direct investment positions of individual firms over time.
The current version provides firm-level panel data for the period 1996 to 2004. The collec- According to equation (6), we calculate the inter-company loan, borrowed from the foreign parent company, to total capital ratios, ICL, using the Midi data. In order to control for company-specific variation in the accession to external debt, we employ the turnover as an indicator of the size and the affiliate's cash-flow in our regression analysis (see e.g. Panno, 2003) . We expect a negative effect of a higher turnover when external and internal debt serve as substitutes (see Buettner et al., 2006a) . As agency costs and the utility of intercompany debt may also vary across industries, we control for further heterogeneity by including dummies for 56 industries at the level of the affiliate.
6 Sec. 26 Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz (Law on Foreign Trade and Payments) in connection with Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung (Foreign Trade and Payment Regulations). Since 2002, FDI has to be reported if the participation is 10% or more and the balance sheet total of the foreign investment in Germany is above 3 million Euro. For details see Lipponer (2006) . Despite that previous years showed lower threshold levels, we apply this threshold level uniformly for all years in the panel. measures, bilateral tax-rate differences are constructed. Since the effective tax reduction from using debt might be zero if a subsidiary carries forward any losses for tax purposes (see MacKie-Mason, 1990; Francois, 2006) , we include a dummy variable indicating whether some loss carry-forward is reported. Of course, the existence of some losses in the previous periods may capture other characteristics of the current decision problem of the company such as the expected performance of an affiliate. Thus, the overall effect on internal leverage is ambiguous. Table 2 displays basic information about the regression variables.
--Insert Table 2 about here --
Empirical Results
The empirical analysis involves panel-data regressions that include company fixed effects.
Hence, by using a within transformation, we generally control for all time-constant heterogeneity between company groups.
--Insert Table 3 about here --First of all, it is worth mentioning that all regressions show the expected tax rate effect. In Table 3 , specification (2) indicates, for example, that a 10 percentage point increase in the 7 Our measure takes into account that only half of all interest payments can be deducted from the tax base of the German trade income tax. Furthermore, we consider the country average of the local trade income tax. (4) and (5). In column (4) we observe that the treated group, i.e. holdings and incorporated firms, responds to the tighter thin-capitalization rule, and internal lending is reduced in the post-reform period. Column (5) shows that the reform was by no means anticipated. Rather, it took the companies one year to reduce their internal debt shares. This is possibly the result of a restructuring process which started in
2001.
A company is only affected if the thin-capitalization rule is binding, i.e. if the firm's debtto-equity share is above the maximally accepted share. In this case, the tax-planning firm should re-optimize its capital structure after the reform, if the construction so far has been optimal. Nevertheless, given the continuum of internal-debt-to-equity shares, not all corporations are affected. However, the mean share is reduced for the whole treatment group because of certain corporations. Consequently, the treatment effect would be much stronger if all treated corporations were noticeably affected.
--Insert Table 4 about here -- The specifications (1)- (3) consider ordinary corporations as the treatment group and partnerships as the control group. Specifications (4)-(6) investigate the tax effects on inter-company debt of holding corporations; partnerships constitute the control group again. One major insight from Table 4 is that holdings adapt their capital structure much faster than ordinary incorporated companies. The restructuring process is possibly easier, and therefore faster for some reason. Moreover, the threshold level was reduced more severely for holding corporations. Another reason might be the potential role of holding corporations as special tax-planning entities.
The magnitude of the treatment effects can be interpreted as follows. For holding corpora- The results in Table 5 show once more that some companies restructure, basically those which were affected by the stricter rule, and reduce their internal debt share, i.e. the mean debt share decreases for the treated group. Specifications (1) and (2) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 per cent inter-company debt to total capital.
--Insert Table 5 about here --
Conclusion
We find that international tax-rate differentials play an important role in determining the share of internal lending to German affiliates. This confirms earlier results provided by other studies. The important insight of our empirical analysis is that German thincapitalization rules are effectively imposed. A reduction of the allowed debt-to-equity ra- Finally, we focus on revenue effects. Although we cannot estimate how much revenue Germany would lose in the absence of a thin-capitalization rule, rough estimations of the reform effects can be provided. First of all, we consider specifications (3) and (6) from 
Data Sources and Definitions
Firm-level data are taken from the micro-level dataset of the Bundesbank, see Lipponer (2006) for an overview. The inter-company debt share from the foreign parent company is determined by the level of balance-sheet liabilities in the respective category divided by total capital consisting of registered capital, capital reserves and profit reserves, as well as internal and external debt.
Corporate taxation data are taken from the IBFD, and from tax surveys provided by the tax advisory companies Ernst&Young, PwC and KPMG. .811 The dependent variable is the share of inter-company loans borrowed from the foreign parent company. Specifications (1) -(3) are based on a sample of ordinary corporations and partnerships. Specifications (4) -(6) are based on a sample, which consists of holding corporations and partnerships. Robust and clustered (country/year clusters) standard errors are in parentheses. A star denotes significance at 5% and two stars at the 1% level. All estimates include a full set of 5,105/738 firm and 56 industry fixed effects. .773 The dependent variable is the share of inter-company loans borrowed from the foreign parent company. Specifications (1) -(2) are based on the whole sample, whereas (3) and (4) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
